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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE NOT SO NARROW TAILORING
OF STATE LIMITS ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000)
Justin B. Uhlemann*

Respondents, a political action committee and an unsuccessful
candidate for state auditor in Missouri's Republican primary, filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,

challenging provisions of Missouri's campaign finance statute.1 Missouri's

statute limited contributions to candidates for state auditor to $1075 per
election.2 Respondents claimed that this limit infringed on their First
Amendment rights of free speech and association by preventing them from
waging an effective campaign.' The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri sustained the statute on cross-motions for
summary judgment.4 Purportedly applying strict scrutiny, the district court
found that Missouri's $1075 limit on contributions was narrowly tailored
to the compelling state interest of preserving the integrity of the election
process.'

* To my parents, Edward and Rebecca Uhlemann, for their boundless inspiration and
support.
1. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 734 (E.D. Mo. 1998). Shrink
Missouri Government PAC gave $1,025 in 1997 and another $50 in 1998 to Zev David Fredman's
campaign for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor. at at 737. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC represented that it would have given more to Mr. Fredman's campaign but for
Missouri's statutory limitation. Id.
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.032 (1997). As amended in 1997, Missouri's campaign finance
statute imposed a $1000 ceiling on contributions from individuals and political action committees
to individual candidates for all statewide offices including state auditor. Id. § 130.032(1). This
ceiling is adjusted every two years for inflation based upon the cumulative consumer price index,
and at the time of this suit was $1075. Id. § 130.032(2) (1997); Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
3. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 736. Respondents also alleged Missouri's campaign finance
statute violated their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, but both lower
courts and the Supreme Court concentrated upon Respondents' First Amendment claims. See Nixon
v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2000).
4. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738-42 (finding Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam) to be controlling).
5. See i The district court stated that "[i]t is firmly settled that regulation of first
amendment rights is 'always subject to exacting judicial review."' 1ad at 737 (emphasis added)
(quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,294 (1981)). The court added
that "'[e]xacting review' means 'strict scrutiny."' Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,
holding that Missouri failed to demonstrate sufficient empirical evidence
of local corruption, actual or perceived, to survive strict scrutiny.6 The

Supreme Court, however, upheld the district court's ruling and expressly
reaffirmed Buckley v. Valeo,7 its seminal case on campaign finance

regulation. 8 The Buckley Court held that campaign contribution limits must
be "closely drawn" to prevent corruption or its jperception "to avoid
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." In affirming Buckley,
the Nixon court HELD that Buckley is the authority for state regulation of

campaign contributions, but actual state limits need not be economically

proportional to Buckley's dollars.10
The Founding Fathers created the First Amendment in large part to

protect political speech and association, which they deemed essential to a
healthy representative democracy." As the United States progressed
economically and technologically over the next two centuries, political

contributions became an increasingly important and effective way for
Americans to participate in the political process." After Watergate and the
campaign finance abuses revealed in its wake, 3 Congress enacted the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 197114 limiting individual campaign

6. ShrinkMo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d519,520-22 (8thCir. 1998). TheAdamscourt
first enjoined enforcement of Missouri's statute before ultimately striking it down as
unconstitutional on its face. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 151 F.3d 763,765 (8th Cir. 1998).
The Eighth Circuit, in applying strict scrutiny, relied upon Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam) (upholding federal contribution limit of $1000 in 1976). Adams, 161 F.3d at 521-22. In a
separate portion of the majority opinion, Chief Judge Bowman also compared Missouri's $1075
limit to Buckley's $1000 limit in 1976. hi at 522. Stating that $1075 in 1976 was the economic
equivalent of $378 in purchasing power in 1998, Chief Judge Bowman would have also found that
Missouri's statute was insufficiently tailored to preserving the integrity of the election process. Id.
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
8. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 910.
9. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.

10. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 901.
11. See, e.g., id. at 916-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 15 ("Mhe constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.") (quoting Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,272 (1971)).
12. See, e.g., Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 919-21 (noting that political candidates have become
increasingly reliant upon individual campaign contributions).
13. See, e.g., HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND

POLMCALREFORM32 (1992). For instance, President Nixon's Committee to Reelect the President
purportedly raised over $50,000,000 in violation of then existing federal campaign finance
regulations. See id.
14. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2000). The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 limited campaign
contributions linked to particular candidates to $1000 per election for individuals and $5000 per
election for political action committees, and these same limits remain today. See id
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contributions linked to particular candidates. This clash of political culture
with apparent institutional impropriety launched a complex constitutional
discourse about campaign finance reform which continues to this day.
The Supreme Court initially addressed the First Amendment

implications of governmental limits on campaign contributions shortly
after the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.1 s In
Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld limits of $1000 for individuals and

$5000 for political action committees on campaign contributions linked to
particular candidates for federal office.16 The Court decided that campaign

contribution limits primarily implicated the First Amendment freedom of
political association." Regarding associational freedoms as fundamental,
the Buckley Court held that campaign contribution limits must be

examined with the "closest scrutiny.""a More specifically, the Buckley
Court stated that campaign contribution limits must be "closely drawn" to
eliminate corruption, or its perception, without unnecessarily abridging
associational freedoms.19

Applying this standard, the Buckley Court concluded that the federal

limits were sufficiently tailored, because they targeted "large"

contributions,' restricted only one aspect of political association,2 and did
not have a substantial impact upon political dialogue. 22 The Court further
15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 24-25. Campaign contribution limits also impact the First Amendment freedom of
speech, but the Buckley Court decided that a statutory limit which survived judicial scrutiny of its
impact upon the freedom of association, afortiori, would survive scrutiny of its impact upon the
freedom of speech. Id. The instant Court expressly adopted this position without reexamining its
premises, analytical framework, or constitutional support. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 904-05.
18. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)
(emphasis added) (holding governmental action to closest scrutiny when freedom to associate may
be curtailed)). While the Buckley Court never expressly invoked strict scrutiny, its superlative
"closest scrutiny" connotes something akin to traditional strict scrutiny analysis. See id.
Furthermore, the Buckley Court explicitly rejected intermediate scrutiny, and many of the
precedents it relied upon in articulating its standard of review applied something akin to strict
scrutiny when examining alleged infringement of the First Amendment freedom of association. See
id. "Precision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a
pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion." Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 903. The Buckley Court simply
deferred to the "rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions." Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 29. Whether or not the Buckley Court. actually applied the standard it articulated is another
question altogether.

19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25.
20. Id at 28-29.
21. Id. The Court stressed that the federal regulations left individuals "free to engage in
independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to
assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates with financial
resources." Id. at 28.
22. Id.The Buckley Court stated (with little evidentiary foundation) that the federal campaign
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found that bribery laws and strict disclosure requirements did not
constitute less restrictive means, because they were only partial solutions
to electoral corruption and its perception. 23 Finally, the Buckley Court

largely deferred the fine tuning of specific dollar amounts to legislative
discretion.2
In the two decades following the landmark Buckley decision, courts
have inconsistently interpreted and applied the standard of review

articulated in Buckley. During the past five years, for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has significantly augmented

25
its judicial oversight of state limits adopted within its jurisdiction.

Indeed, the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Buckley's requisite nexus
between actual contribution limits and empirical evidence of
corruption or
26
its perception spurred the instant Court to grant certiorari.
In Day v. Holohan,27 the Eighth Circuit struck down a Minnesota

statute' limiting individual campaign contributions to political committees
to $100 per election. The court found that this limit was "too low to allow

meaningful participation in protected political speech and association."29
Furthermore, the Day court implied that trial courts should first adjust

statutory limits for inflation since 1976 before applying the Buckley
standard. 30 Adjusted for inflation, the $100 limit was the equivalent of
$40.60 in 1976.3 By inviting lower courts to index state limits for inflation
since 1976 and to compare this number with the Buckley $1000

benchmark, the Eighth Circuit placed a substantial number of campaign

contribution limits did not materially effect the discussion of political issues and candidates by
individuals, associations, the press, other candidates, or political parties. Idat 28-29. In specifically
considering the impact of the federal limits on candidates, the Buckley Court focused upon the
impact on candidates as a whole as opposed to the impact on any particular candidate. See id.
23. Id. at 27-28.
24. See id. at 29-30. The Buckley Court stated that distinctions regarding the actual dollar
limits employed were only judicially significant when they amounted to differences in kind (as
opposed to degree) from constitutional limits. I Furthermore, although the Buckley Court held that
Congress's $1000 limit was not necessarily a constitutional floor, see U, many subsequent
decisions have utilized the Buckley $1000 limit as a benchmark or guide for their analysis.
25. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir.1995); Day v. Holohan, 34 F.3d 1356,
1366 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563,568 (8th Cir. 1998).
26. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,903 (2000). The instant Court also
cited the large number of states which limit political contributions. See id. See generally E.
FErGENBAUM &J. PALMER, CAIGN FINANCE LAw 93 (1998) (citing states which limit political
contributions). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 106.08 (2000) (establishing a $500 limit on contributions per
election).
27. 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (1994).
28. MNN. STAT. § 10A.12 (1993).
29. Day, 34 F.3d at 1366.
30. See id.
31. Id
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finance statutes in danger of invalidation, because many unadjusted state
limits were near or below the $1000 benchmark.
One year later, in Carverv. Nixon,32 the Eighth Circuit also interpreted
the Buckley standard to require a close nexus between contribution limits
and the actual empirical harm they were specifically enacted to prevent.
33
In Carver,the Eighth Circuit struck down a Missouri voter proposition
which limited campaign contributions to individual candidates to between
$100 and $300 per election cycle.' The Carvercourt held that the actual
state limits must be narrowly tailored to local empirical evidence of
corruption 5 or its perception.36 The court insisted that states demonstrate
that the "'regulation will in fact alleviate [real] harms in a direct and
material way."' 37 The Carver court's interpretation and application of
Buckley's standard more closely resembles the type of heightened scrutiny
articulated, yet arguably not applied in Buckley. Accordingly, the Eighth
Circuit again restricted further campaign finance reform by requiring states
to demonstrate a close nexus between the actual harm claimed and the
specific limits imposed.
The instant Court found that Buckley still controlled the
constitutionality of governmental limits on campaign contributions, but
held that specific contribution limits need not be economically
proportional to Buckley's dollars.38 Furthermore, the instant Court found
that Buckley did not per se require any consideration of inflation.39 The
instant Court simply inquired whether there was any showing that the
limits impeded the ability of candidates to "amass the resources

32. 72 F.3d 633, 642 (8th Cir. 1995).
33. PROPOSMON A, Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.100 (1995). After the Carver court struck down
the Missouri voter initiative as unconstitutional on its face, previously enacted Mo. REv. STAT. §
130.032 (1997) was revived and ultimately gave rise to the instant Court's decision.
34. Carver, 72 F.3d at 634.
35. i at 642. Buckley apparently did not require substantial empirical evidence of actual
local corruption or its perception, although the Court relied upon campaign finance abuses revealed
during the Watergate hearings. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. Subsequent decisions, however,
arguably extended Buckley and required heightened evidentiary showings of local proof before
accepting the prevention of corruption or its appearance as a compelling governmental objective.
See Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir. 1998). In the instant case, however, the Court
refused to specifically delineate the quantity of evidence constitutionally required. Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 909 (2000).
36. Carver,72 F.3d at 640-43.
37. Id. at 638 (citing United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,475
(1995) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994))).
38. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 901.
39. Id. at 909. But cf. Day v. Holohan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994) (indexing for
inflation).
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necessary for effective advocacy."' 4 The instant Court found no evidence

of suppressed political advocacy since enactment of the statute, but
admittedly concentrated its analysis upon candidates as a group.41 It asked

whether the limits made political association ineffective, prevented
candidate's voices from being noticed, and rendered contributions
pointless. 42 While explicitly reaffirming the authority of Buckley, the

instant Court arguably relaxed the narrow tailoring recently required by the
Eighth Circuit. Consequently, the instant Court halted the Eighth Circuit's
recent active oversight of campaign contribution limits and paved the way
for more extensive campaign finance reform.

By reaffirming the vitality of Buckley, however, the instant Court
leaned upon the case whose progeny prompted this decision in the first

place without significantly advancing the constitutional discourse. The
Buckley Court purported to apply "closest scrutiny" after invoking
decisions which analyzed infringement of the freedom of association with
something akin to strict scrutiny.43 The Buckley Court's articulation and

application of its standard of review, however, ultimately led to
inconsistent interpretations of its requisite scrutiny. 44 The instant Court
failed to adequately clear up exactly what level of scrutiny Buckley

40. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 908-09 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). The Buckley Court
mentioned that campaign contribution limits could seriously impact political dialogue if they
prevented candidates from amassing enough resources to effectively advocate their candidacy.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21; see also Curtis K. Tao, A Compelling Opportunityto Rethink the Flawed
Evolution of ContributionSpeech, 51 RuTGERS L REv. 1345, 1365-67 (1999) (arguing so many
other factors impact effective advocacy that any standard based upon effective advocacy is
ultimately unworkable). However, the Buckley Court found that there was no indication that the
$1000 federal limit unduly hampered the funding of the average political campaign. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 21.
41. See Nixon, 120 S.Ct. at 909. The instant Court stated that "a showing of one affected
individual does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that would be
unconstitutional under Buckley." Id.
42. lId
43. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-40.
44. See id. While the Buckley Court purported to apply "closest scrutiny," it arguably applied
a standard much more lenient. See id, This apparent divergence of word and act led to inconsistent
interpretations of Buckley's requirements in subsequent cases. "The analytic foundation of
Buckley... was tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the intervening
years." Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 917-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The instant Court failed to eliminate
the confusion by reaffirming Buckley without qualifying the requisite level of scrutiny.
Furthermore, the instant Court again arguably applied a standard less stringent than the type of
scrutiny upon which Buckley's foundation is built. "mhe Court proceed[ed] to apply something
less, much less, than strict scrutiny. Just how much less the majority never says." Id. at 922
(Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Even the instant Court admitted that "[p]recision about the relative rigor
of the standard to review contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion."
Id. at 903.
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required, and left state legislatures and lower courts in the same position
of uncertainty as before its decision.
Besides failing to clear up the level of scrutiny articulated and applied
by the Buckley Court, the instant Court also offered an unworkable
standard for legislatures designing campaign finance reform and lower
courts evaluating challenged regulations.4 5 The instant Court stressed that
state campaign contribution limits would be constitutional so long as they
did not "impede the ability of candidates to 'amass the resources
necessary for effective advocacy."'" A standard based upon effective
advocacy is ultimately unworkable, however, because so many factors
besides actual contribution limits have an impact upon the ability of
candidates to effectively advocate their political campaigns. 47 Local
political climate, party politics, individual intelligence, personal appeal,
luck, incumbency, and advances in communication technology all can
affect the ability of any given candidate to effectively advocate their
campaign message. 48 Accordingly, the instant Court placed a significant
burden upon state legislatures and district courts to assess the relative
weight of all the myriad factors which impact effective advocacy when
constructing and construing campaign contribution limits.
Furthermore, the instant Court's effective advocacy standard departs
markedly from the First Amendment doctrinal foundation of Buckley.49
First, while the First Amendment freedom of association is usually
construed as an individual right of each potential political candidate, the
instant Court focused its analysis upon the effect of Missouri's statute
5 Second,
upon the electoral system as a whole and candidates as a group.Y
the instant Court's effective advocacy standard primarily concentrates upon
the effect of the existing limits on political advocacy, without also
critically examining whether the limits themselves were narrowly tailored
45. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909-10; see also Tao, supra note 40, at 1366.
46: Nixon, 120 S. CL at 909 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21) (emphasis added).
47. See Tao, supranote 40, at 1366. While itis clearly appropriate for the Court to avoid fine
discriminations regarding specific dollar amounts more properly left to legislative bodies, its
effective advocacy standard offers state legislatures and lower courts limited insight regarding the
ultimate constitutional limits.

48. hL
49. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-34 (1976).
50. See Nixon, 120 S.Ct. at 921-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[The right to free [speech and political association] is a right held by each

American, not by Americans en masse. The Court in Buckley provided no basis
for suppressing the speech of an individual candidate simply because other
candidates (or candidates in the aggregate) may succeed in reaching the voting
public.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VOL 52

to the specific local harms claimed.51 Instead of concentrating upon the
narrowest limits which would prevent the actual corruption or its
perception documented, the instant Court focused upon candidates'
abilities as a group to amass the resources necessary to effectively advocate
under the rule already in place.5 2 This type of analysis distorts the
traditional mechanics of strict scrutiny and again signals that the Court
applied a more lenient standard than it articulated.
The instant Court also declined to re-examine the argument that
bribery, anti-gratuity, and mandatory disclosure laws are less restrictive
legislative alternatives which effectively preempt campaign contribution
limitations.53 The Buckley Court quietly dismissed bribery and disclosure
laws as only partial solutions to the problem of electoral corruption,54 and
the instant Court found nothing which would alter the Buckley Court's
analysis today.55 Strict and comprehensive disclosure laws, however,
would give citizens the necessary context to judge the motives and actions
of individual candidates and politicians.5 6 With the emergence of the
available almost instantaneously.57

internet, this information could be
Accordingly, the instant Court's summary discounting of arguably less
restrictive means again demonstrates that it applied some lesser form of
scrutiny.
Just as campaign finance reform resurfaced at the forefront of national
politics, the Supreme Court delivered its long awaited opinion regarding
its constitutional boundaries.5 8 The instant Court's anti-climatic
reaffirmation of Buckley, however, failed to clarify Buckley's standard of
review and failed to offer a workable standard for state legislatures and
lower courts to employ when constructing and construing future campaign

51. See id. at 909.
52. See id. This observation offers another indication that the instant Court (and arguably the
Buckley Court as well) applied a standard less stringent than the traditional strict scrutiny generally
associated with the First Amendment freedom of political association.
53. See id.
5.4. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28. "[L]aws maldng criminal the giving and taldng ofbribes deal
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental
action." Id. Furthermore, the Buckley Court stated that Congress was entitled to conclude that
contribution limits were necessary even alongside mandatory disclosure of contributors and
amounts. Id.
55. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909.
56. Id. at 926 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Missouri already has strict disclosure requirements
in place. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 130.041, .046, .057 (1999).
57. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 915 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The availability of an almost
instantaneous disclosure medium (the internet) is a substantial change since 1976 and militates in
favor of a reevaluation of the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure regulations as less restrictive
legislative means.
58. See id.
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finance reform. 59 Additionally, the limits in the instant case are far more
severe than those the Court encountered in Buckley. 60 Furthermore, it is
hard to believe that contributions this small could truly foster corruption
or even its perception. '
More liberal contribution limits combined with strict disclosure
requirements and bribery laws may effectively combat corruption and its
appearance without trampling traditional First Amendment freedoms of
association. This type of less-restrictive alternative would more readily
satisfy the heightened scrutiny articulated by the First Amendment
doctrinal foundation of both Buckley and Nixon. More liberal limits
combined with strict disclosure may even reduce reliance upon the socalled "soft money" which has infiltrated American politics in recent
elections.6 2 Considering the current fervor for campaign finance reform,
there is little doubt that the Supreme Court will very shortly have another
opportunity to reevaluate the vitality of Buckley. Perhaps next time it will
offer further clarity in this emerging and important area of law.

59. While both the Buckley and Nixon Courts purported to apply something akin to strict
scrutiny, both arguably applied a less stringent standard. The instant Court's hesitance to pin down
a black letter standard of review is understandable, but the effective advocacy rubric articulated by
the instant Court is divorced from the traditional mechanics of strict scrutiny and is practically
unworkable. Furthermore, since the Buckley's decision has spawned inconsistent interpretations,
the instant Court could have taken this opportunity to further clarify and positively advance the law
of campaign finance reform. The Court predictably replied by invoking a familiar constitutional
principle: "Ihe answer is that we are supposed to decide this case. [The Respondents] did not request
that Buckley be overruled; the furthest reach of their arguments about the law was that subsequent
decisions already on the books had enhanced the State's burden ofjustification beyond what Buckley
required." Id. at909.
60. See id. at 924-25. Adjusted for inflation, Missouri's limit on individual contributions to
candidates for state auditor is the equivalent of $251 in 1976. See also Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v.
Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 523, n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that based upon the Consumer Price index,
a dollar buys about a third of what it did when Buckley was decided). Furthermore, Missouri's
statute limits the contributions of political action committees to $1075 as compared with Buckley's
$5000 limit in 1976.
61. This is another point the instant Court failed to adequately consider and is especially apt
regarding statewide or national elections.
62. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 914-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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